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THE NEED FOR SNEED: A LOOPHOLE IN 
THE ARMED CAREER CRIMINAL ACT 
Abstract: On March 24, 2010, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh 
Circuit, in United States v. Sneed, held that courts may not use police reports 
to determine if prior offenses occurred on different occasions for the 
purposes of the Armed Career Criminal Act. In so doing, the court nar-
rowed the class of offenders that qualify as career offenders and created a 
loophole that allows some offenders to avoid the ACCA’s mandatory 
minimum sentence if their previous offenses were not well documented in 
judicially approved sources. This Comment argues that in order to correct 
the problem of the Sneed loophole, Congress should amend the ACCA by 
defining different “occasions” so that the statute can be consistently ap-
plied in all jurisdictions and will not force juries to examine the facts un-
derlying a defendant’s previous convictions. 
Introduction 
 The federal Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) imposes a fifteen-
year mandatory minimum sentence on habitual offenders who have 
three prior convictions for violent felonies or serious drug offenses.1 
The ACCA’s purpose is to create consistent federal penalties to reduce 
crimes committed by armed, career criminals.2 It was passed in 1984 
and Congress amended it twice before arriving at the current definition 
of a career criminal, in 1988.3 This definition requires offenders’ previ-
ous offenses to have been committed on different occasions.4 
 In March 2010, in United States v. Sneed, the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Eleventh Circuit addressed the sources a sentencing judge may 
use to determine whether an offender’s previous offenses meet this 
ACCA requirement.5 The Eleventh Circuit ruled that a sentencing 
judge may not use police reports to determine if previous crimes oc-
curred on different occasions.6 The court thereby narrowed the class of 
                                                                                                                      
 
1 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (2006). 
2 H.R. Rep. No. 98–1073, at 1 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3661, 3661. 
3 Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98–473, ch. XVIII, § 1802, 98 Stat. 
1837, 2185 (amended 1986); James G. Levine, Note, The Armed Career Criminal Act and the 
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines: Moving Toward Consistency, 46 Harv. J. on Legis. 537, 547–48 
(2009). 
4 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). 
5 See generally 600 F.3d 1326 (11th Cir. 2010). 
6 Id. at 1332. The Eleventh Circuit is not the first circuit to hold that only judicial 
documents may be used to determine whether prior convictions occurred on different 
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persons in that circuit identified as career criminals under the ACCA 
because offenders, such as the defendant in Sneed, will not qualify as 
career criminals when prosecutors do not document the crimes in suf-
ficient detail in judicial documents.7 Sneed creates, in effect, a loophole 
that allows offenders who would otherwise be labeled career criminals 
to avoid the mandatory minimum sentence if their previous offenses 
were not well documented in sources approved by the court.8 
 Part I of this Comment gives an overview of the history of the 
ACCA.9 Part II then examines and discusses why the Sneed loophole 
exists.10 Finally, Part III explores the problems created by the Sneed 
loophole and argues that, in order to correct those problems while re-
maining within the bounds of the Constitution, Congress should 
amend the ACCA to define when crimes occur on different “occa-
sions.” 
I. Sneed and the History of the ACCA 
 For the ACCA to fulfill its purpose of achieving consistent sentenc-
ing for repeat offenders,11 the statute must accurately define “career 
criminals.” In the original 1984 version of the ACCA, Congress defined 
the term narrowly.12 Offenders were required to have “three previous 
convictions . . . for robbery or burglary, or both,” because it was found 
that a high percentage of robberies and burglaries were committed by a 
limited number of repeat offenders.13 
 The ACCA was amended by the Career Criminals Amendment Act 
of 1986, which broadened the requirement for the three previous con-
victions from “for robbery or burglary, or both” to “for a violent felony 
                                                                                                                      
occasions for the purpose of the ACCA. See, e.g., United States v. Fuller, 453 F.3d 274, 279–
80 (5th Cir. 2006); United States v. Harris, 447 F.3d 1300, 1305–06 (10th Cir. 2006); United 
States v. Thompson, 421 F.3d 278, 282, 286 (4th Cir. 2005); United States v. Taylor, 413 F.3d 
1146, 1157 (10th Cir. 2005). 
7 See Sneed, 600 F.3d at 1333; United States v. Richardson, 230 F.3d 1297, 1300 n.3 
(11th Cir. 2000). 
8 See Sneed, 600 F.3d at 1333. 
9 See infra notes 11–33 and accompanying text. 
10 See infra notes 34–55 and accompanying text. 
11 H.R. Rep. No. 98–1073, at 1–3 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3661, 3661–63. 
12 See id.; Krystle Lamprecht, Comment, Formal, Categorical, but Incomplete: The Need for a 
New Standard in Evaluating Prior Convictions Under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 98 J. Crim. 
L. & Criminology 1407, 1411–12 (2008). 
13 Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98–473, ch. XVIII, § 1802, 98 Stat. 
1837, 2185 (amended 1986); H.R. Rep. No. 98–1073, at 3. 
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or a serious drug offense, or both.”14 Senator Arlen Specter, who intro-
duced the Senate bill, said that it would “broaden th[e] definition [of 
career criminal] so that we may have a greater sweep and more effec-
tive use of this important statute.”15 
 In 1988, in response to an Eighth Circuit decision in which the 
simultaneous robbery of six people was held to satisfy the ACCA re-
quirement for previous convictions, Congress amended the ACCA a 
second time.16 This amendment narrowed the class of offenders identi-
fied as career criminals by adding the requirement that the offender’s 
previous convictions be committed on separate occasions.17 
 Since 1988, the only changes regarding the definition of a career 
criminal have come from judicial interpretation of the statute.18 Both 
of the ACCA’s predicates for previous convictions—that they be violent 
felonies or serious drug offenses, and that they be committed on dif-
ferent occasions—have been the subject of litigation.19 
 One refinement to the ACCA came in Sneed.20 The defendant in 
Sneed was sentenced to 180 months under the ACCA after being con-
victed of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon and possession of 
marijuana.21 Two of his prior convictions were for selling crack cocaine 
on the same day, thirty-nine minutes apart.22 The defendant argued on 
appeal that these two convictions did not occur on different occasions, 
and that the court was prohibited by a 2005 U.S. Supreme Court deci-
sion, Shepard v. United States, from using police reports to determine the 
                                                                                                                      
14 Career Criminals Amendment Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99–570, § 1402(a), 100 Stat. 
3207, 3207–39 (amended 1988); Levine, supra note 3, at 547. 
15 132 Cong. Rec. 7697 (1986); see also Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 582–90 
(1990) (summarizing the history of the Career Criminals Amendment Act). 
16 Clarification of Predicate Offense Requirements for Armed Career Criminal Act, 
Pub. L. No. 100–690, § 7056, 102 Stat. 4181, 4402 (1988) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) 
(2006)); James E. Hooper, Note, Bright Lines, Dark Deeds: Counting Convictions Under the 
Armed Career Criminal Act, 89 Mich. L. Rev. 1951, 1965–66 (1991); see United States v. Petty, 
798 F.2d 1157, 1159–60 (8th Cir. 1986). 
17 Section 7056, 102 Stat. at 4402; Derrick D. Crago, Note, The Problem of Counting to 
Three Under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 41 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 1179, 1185–86 (1991). 
18 See Levine, supra note 3, at 548; see also, e.g., Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 26 
(2005) (holding that prior burglary offenses under a nongeneric burglary statute are predi-
cate offenses for career criminals if elements of generic burglary are included in a list of ap-
proved judicial documents); Taylor, 495 U.S. at 602 (holding that prior offenses for career 
criminals are defined categorically but a court can go beyond the fact of prior conviction to 
find all elements of generic burglary). 
19 See, e.g., Taylor, 495 U.S. at 602; United States v. Hobbs, 136 F.3d 384, 387–90 (4th Cir. 
1998). 
20 See 600 F.3d 1326, 1332–33 (11th Cir. 2010). 
21 Id. at 1327. 
22 Id. at 1328. 
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facts.23 After examining Shepard, the Eleventh Circuit overruled its 2000 
decision in United States v. Richardson, which had allowed the use of po-
lice reports when examining the underlying facts of previous convic-
tions.24 
 Shepard held that judges could not look to police reports to deter-
mine whether a defendant convicted under a nongeneric burglary 
statute was guilty of generic burglary as required by the “violent felo-
nies or serious drug offenses” predicate of the ACCA.25 Although the 
Court explicitly rejected the use of police reports, it listed a series of 
sources that could be used to determine the facts underlying previous 
convictions.26 Those sources include the terms of the charging docu-
ment, the terms of a plea agreement or transcript of colloquy between 
judge and defendant in which the factual basis for the plea was con-
firmed by the defendant, or some comparable judicial record of this 
information.27 Sneed applied Shepard’s list of approved sources to the 
ACCA’s separate occasions predicate.28 
 In their Shepard and Sneed holdings, the Supreme Court and Elev-
enth Circuit avoided constitutional questions regarding the scope of 
judicial fact finding when the right to a jury trial has not been waived 
by adopting the holdings of Supreme Court cases such as Jones v. United 
States and Apprendi v. New Jersey, decided respectively in 1999 and 2000.29 
Under these cases, the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments guarantee 
that, with one exception, a jury must determine any factual finding that 
                                                                                                                      
23 Id.; see Shepard, 544 U.S. at 26. 
24 Sneed, 600 F.3d at 1332; United States v. Richardson, 230 F.3d 1297, 1299–1300 (11th 
Cir. 2000). In the 1990 case of Taylor v. United States, the Supreme Court held that Congress 
intended to use a categorical approach to determine who qualified under the ACCA, but 
carved out a narrow exception to go beyond the fact of conviction in cases where a court 
needed to find all the elements of generic burglary. 495 U.S. at 600–02. In Richardson, the 
Eleventh Circuit concluded that another exception should be created to determine whether 
prior offenses were committed successively or simultaneously for the purpose of the ACCA 
because that determination could not be made by the mere fact of conviction, and was there-
fore not suited to a categorical approach. See 230 F.3d at 1299–1300. 
25 544 U.S. at 16. A generic burglary statute requires a burglary to be committed in a 
building or enclosed space, and a nongeneric burglary statute defines burglary more 
broadly. Id. at 16–17. For example, entries into boats and motor vehicles may also qualify 
as burglary under a nongeneric statute. Id. 
26 Id. at 16, 26. 
27 Id. at 26. 
28 Sneed, 600 F.3d at 1332–33. 
29 See Shepard, 544 U.S. at 25–26; Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 475–76 (2000); 
Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 248–49 (1999); Sneed, 600 F.3d at 1331–32. 
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is essential to an increase in a potential criminal penalty.30 The excep-
tion to this rule—the fact of a prior conviction—was established by the 
Supreme Court in 1998 in Almendarez-Torres v. United States.31 Because 
the factual inquires in Shepard and Sneed extended beyond the fact of 
prior conviction, any facts essential to increasing the defendants’ sen-
tences had to be examined by the jury.32 This was accomplished by lim-
iting the sentencing judge to information documented in Shepard-
approved sources.33 
II. Why the Sneed Loophole Exists 
 The Eleventh Circuit in Sneed rejected the use of police reports in 
determining whether an offender’s crimes were committed on separate 
occasions because it felt that the 2005 U.S Supreme Court decision in 
Shepard v. United States required that result.34 The court identified three 
aspects of Shepard that were particularly important.35 First, the Court in 
Shepard examined and expressly rejected an argument for using police 
reports.36 Second, Shepard allowed sentencing judges to use only a list 
of judicial records, and not police reports, to determine the nature of 
prior convictions.37 Finally, Shepard stressed the constitutional guaran-
tee that a jury must find a disputed fact about a prior conviction when 
that fact would increase a maximum potential sentence, a guarantee 
recognized in Jones v. United States and Apprendi v. New Jersey, decided in 
1999 and 2000 respectively by the U.S. Supreme Court.38 
 Shepard emphasized the Jones decision for the proposition that the 
Sixth Amendment guarantees a jury finding of any essential fact that 
increases the ceiling of a potential sentence.39 The issue in Jones was 
whether “serious bodily injury” in a subsection of the federal carjacking 
statute was an element of the offense or a sentencing enhancement.40 
                                                                                                                      
30 Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 476; Jones, 526 U.S. at 248–49. See Courtney P. Fain, Note, 
What’s in a Name? The Worrisome Interchange of Juvenile “Adjudications” with Criminal “Convic-
tions,” 49 B.C. L. Rev. 495, 511–15 (2008). 
31 523 U.S. 224, 226–227 (1998). 
32 See Shepard, 544 U.S. at 24–26; Sneed, 600 F.3d at 1332. 
33 Shepard, 544 U.S. at 26; Sneed, 600 F.3d at 1332–33. 
34 United States v. Sneed, 600 F.3d 1326, 1332 (11th Cir. 2010). 
35 Id. at 1331–32. 
36 Id. at 1331. 
37 Id. at 1332. 
38 Id. (citing Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000); Jones v. United States, 
526 U.S. 227, 243 (1999)). 
39 See Shepard, 544 U.S. at 24–25. 
40 526 U.S. at 230, 239. 
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The Court held that it was an element of the offense because it in-
creased the maximum sentence for the crime, but it recognized that 
the contrary reading was also possible.41 Because the contrary reading 
would give rise to constitutional doubt, however, the Court rejected 
that reading.42 Justice Souter explained that removing the jury’s con-
trol over facts that would determine the sentencing range would dimin-
ish the jury’s significance, which would present an issue under an area 
of law not yet settled—the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee to a jury 
trial.43 Therefore, to avoid constitutional questions, the subsections of 
the carjacking statute were held to be separate offenses, all of the ele-
ments of which must be submitted to a jury for consideration.44 
 In Apprendi, the Court expanded the holding of Jones to state stat-
utes through the application of the Fourteenth Amendment.45 The de-
fendant’s sentence in Apprendi was increased under New Jersey’s hate 
crime statute, and the Court determined that the facts must be submit-
ted to the jury because the statute required an inquiry to determine if 
the defendant had a biased purpose in committing the crime.46 This 
inquiry required a determination of what happened in the commission 
of the offense, which the Court distinguished from determining the 
fact of a prior conviction because that fact is unrelated to the commis-
sion of the instant offense, and, therefore, does not have to be exam-
ined by the jury.47 
 There remains one exception to the Jones and Apprendi holdings 
that facts essential to an increase in the ceiling of a potential sentence 
must be submitted to a jury.48 This exception is for the fact of prior 
conviction and was established by Almendarez-Torres v. United States, a 
U.S. Supreme Court decided in 1998, which held that a statute increas-
ing the sentence for an illegal alien who reenters the country after be-
ing convicted of a felony and is subsequently deported was a sentencing 
factor and not a separate offense.49 Although Almendarez-Torres has 
never been overturned, Justice Thomas, who joined the five-justice ma-
                                                                                                                      
41 Id. at 239. 
42 Id. 
43 Id. at 248. 
44 Id. at 251–52. 
45 Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 476. 
46 Id. at 469–70, 496. 
47 Id. at 496. 
48 Id. at 487–90; Jones, 526 U.S. at 248–49, 249 n.10. 
49 523 U.S. 224, 229, 234–35 (1998). 
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jority, later repudiated his decision because he felt that the holding had 
been eroded by the Court’s subsequent jurisprudence.50 
 Because Sneed subsequently adopted Shepard’s reasoning, both 
Shepard and Sneed are based on the Jones/Apprendi understanding that 
factual inquiries into an offender’s previous convictions for the purpose 
of the ACCA must be made by a jury under the Sixth and Fourteenth 
Amendments.51 The Court determined that the fact of prior conviction 
exception to the Jones/Apprendi rule exemplified by Almendarez-Torres 
did not apply in Shepard, and therefore the exception did not apply to 
Sneed either.52 
 This understanding that a jury must inquire into the facts of previ-
ous convictions for the ACCA justifies the loophole created by Sneed.53 
The Eleventh Circuit, following the Jones and Apprendi cases, deter-
mined that constitutional concerns take priority over the application of 
the ACCA.54 This led the court to reject the use of police reports and 
limit the documents that could be used for the inquiry to Shepard-
approved sources, creating the Sneed loophole.55 
III. The Sneed Loophole: Problems and Solutions 
 Because the question of whether prior convictions occurred on 
different occasions goes beyond the fact of prior conviction, the Elev-
enth Circuit determined that it was a fact that must be submitted to the 
jury, and thereby created the Sneed loophole.56 Although there are sev-
eral problems associated with this loophole, its existence is justified by 
the constitutional right to a jury trial.57 Because of the importance of 
this constitutional right, the solution to the Sneed loophole’s problems 
must come from Congress rather than the courts.58 
 The Sneed loophole creates three primary problems.59 First, it will 
lead to inconsistency in the ACCA’s application.60 It forces courts to ig-
                                                                                                                      
50 Shepard, 544 U.S. at 27–28 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
51 See id. at 25–26 (majority opinion); Sneed, 600 F.3d at 1331–32. 
52 Shepard, 544 U.S. at 25; see Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 226–27; Sneed, 600 F.3d at 
1331–32. 
53 See 600 F.3d at 1331–32. 
54 See id. at 1333. 
55 See id. 
56 See United States v. Sneed, 600 F.3d 1326, 1331–33 (11th Cir. 2010). 
57 See infra notes 60–73 and accompanying text. 
58 See infra notes 74–80 and accompanying text. 
59 See infra notes 61–69 and accompanying text. 
60 See Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 35–37 (2005) (O’Connor, J., dissenting); 
Lamprecht, supra note 13, at 1426–29. 
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nore readily obtainable information about prior convictions, and in-
stead evaluate only information in Shepard-approved sources, which will 
vary by jurisdiction.61 
 Second, the approach adopted by the court in Sneed creates a risk 
of prejudice because it requires the jury to examine the facts of prior 
convictions.62 The dissent in the 2005 U.S. Supreme Court case Shepard 
v. United States elaborated on this problem in the context of the ACCA: 
“When ACCA defendants in the future go to trial rather than plead 
guilty, the majority’s ruling in effect invites the Government, in prose-
cuting the federal gun charge, also ‘to prove to the jury’ the defendant’s 
prior burglaries.”63 The same would be true for determining whether 
crimes occurred on different occasions.64 For example, in Sneed, requir-
ing the jury to decide whether two previous convictions for purchasing 
crack cocaine occurred on different occasions could prejudice them 
against Sneed in the current case.65 
 Third, deciding cases to avoid constitutional concerns can under-
mine congressional intent.66 In creating the ACCA, Congress intended 
a categorical approach to identify career criminals and Shepard and 
Sneed address the two exceptions to that approach.67 By prohibiting the 
use of police reports, Shepard and Sneed risk introducing arbitrariness 
into the ACCA.68 
 Each of these problems is valid, but they can all be justified by the 
same argument: the constitutional concerns about the right to a jury 
trial are more important than other, non-constitutional problems cre-
ated by the Sneed loophole.69 In the 2000 Supreme Court case Apprendi 
v. New Jersey, Justice Scalia addressed concerns about consistency while 
emphasizing the necessity of prioritizing constitutional concerns over 
strict application of a statutory sentence: 
Will there be disparities? Of course. But the criminal will 
never get more punishment than he bargained for when he 
                                                                                                                      
61 See Shepard, 544 U.S. at 35–36 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
62 See Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 234–35 (1998); Lamprecht, 
supra note 13, at 1413–14. 
63 Shepard, 544 U.S. at 38 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
64 See Sneed, 600 F.3d at 1328–29, 1333. 
65 See Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 234–35; Sneed, 600 F.3d at 1328–29. 
66 See Shepard, 544 U.S. at 28 (O’Connor, J., dissenting); Sneed, 600 F.3d at 1333; Lam-
precht, supra note 13, at 1416–19. 
67 Shepard, 544 U.S. at 36 (O’Connor, J., dissenting); Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 
575, 600–01 (1990); Sneed, 600 F.3d at 1332. 
68 Shepard, 544 U.S. at 36 (O’Connor, J., dissenting); see Sneed, 600 F.3d at 1332. 
69 See Shepard, 544 U.S. at 25–26. 
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did the crime, and his guilt of the crime (and hence the 
length of the sentence to which he is exposed) will be deter-
mined beyond a reasonable doubt by the unanimous vote of 12 of his 
fellow citizens.70 
 By creating the Sneed loophole, the Eleventh Circuit avoided the 
possibility of depriving defendants of the constitutional right to a jury 
trial and decreased the possibility of sentencing someone who is not a 
career criminal under the ACCA.71 The court determined that these 
positive effects outweighed the problems created by the loophole be-
cause of the fundamental nature of the guarantee that a jury stand be-
tween a defendant and the power of the State, as well as the fact that 
defendants may choose to waive the right to have a jury decide ques-
tions about their prior convictions.72 
 The decision in Sneed was necessary both because it applied the 
Shepard precedent and because it valued the constitutional right to a 
jury trial over the problems that the decision created.73 There is a way, 
however, to remedy the problems without creating constitutional 
doubt.74 Because judicial interpretation of the ACCA made determining 
when prior convictions occurred problematic, Congress should respond 
by amending the ACCA, which has not been done in twenty-two years.75 
Congress should close the Sneed loophole by more narrowly tailoring the 
requirement that previous convictions be committed on different occa-
sions by career criminals.76 Congress should define “occasions different 
from one another” in such a way that courts would not have to prejudice 
the jury by engaging in an inquiry of facts underlying the previous con-
victions.77 For example, crimes committed on the same day could be 
defined by statute as occurring on the same occasion.78 Such an 
amendment would make sentencing under the ACCA more consistent, 
while keeping its application categorical, as Congress intended.79 
                                                                                                                      
70 Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 498 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
71 See id.; Sneed, 600 F.3d at 1333. 
72 See Shepard, 544 U.S. at 25, 26 n.5; Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 234–35; Sneed, 600 
F.3d at 1333. 
73 See Sneed, 600 F.3d at 1331–33. 
74 See Crago, supra note 17, at 1205–06; Levine, supra note 3, at 548–50. 
75 See Levine, supra note 3, at 548–50; Shepard, 544 U.S. at 35–36 (O’Connor, J., dissent-
ing). See generally Hooper, supra note 16. 
76 See Crago, supra note 17, at 1199–1207; Levine, supra note 3, at 555–56. 
77 See Shepard, 544 U.S. at 38 (O’Connor, J., dissenting); Crago, supra note 17 at 1205–
06; Levine, supra note 3 at 555–58. 
78 See Levine, supra note 3 at 555–58. 
79 See Taylor, 495 U.S. 600–02; Levine, supra note 3, at 555–56. 
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Conclusion 
 The Sneed case overturned precedent in the Eleventh Circuit that 
had allowed sentencing judges to use police reports to determine if 
previous crimes were committed on different occasions for the pur-
poses of the ACCA. This created a loophole that allows some offenders 
to avoid being classified as career criminals if it is not documented in 
Shepard-approved sources whether their prior offenses occurred on dif-
ferent occasions. This loophole was held to be necessary to comply with 
the constitutional rule that any fact, other than that of a prior convic-
tion, that increases the maximum penalty for a crime must be exam-
ined by a jury. Because the Sneed loophole is constitutionally mandated, 
Congress would have to amend the ACCA in order to solve the prob-
lems created by it. In so doing, Congress could more accurately identify 
career criminals while remaining consistent with the categorical ap-
proach that the statute intended. 
Emily Marano 
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